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Arrival time is 8.15 a.m.' Attorneys conjure up thoughts of issues, such
as what time the judge will take the bench, how full is the morning docket
and whether it has been updated, how many arraignments have been sched-
uled,' children on pickup order status,3 termination of a plea and pass,4 af-
* The author is a J.D. Candidate for May 2004 at Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center. He is originally from Boca Raton, Florida. The author extends a
special thank you to Professor Phyllis Coleman for her invaluable dedication and helpful
suggestions to this article. He also extends a thank you to Maria Vernace, Editor-in-Chief of
Nova Law Review, for her contribution to the publication of this article.
1. This is an account of my personal experience as a Certified Legal Intern with the
Broward County Public Defender's Office, Juvenile Division. I was an Intern during the Fall
semester of my third year of law school, interning for a period of two and a half months.
2. An arraignment is the step in a criminal prosecution where the defendant is brought
before the court for a formal reading of a charges and entering of a plea. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 82 (7th ed. 1999).
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ternoon docket, number of trials, witnesses and whether they have been sub-
poenaed, violation of probation hearings,5 and on and on. The adversarial
playground called juvenile court awaits the arrival of a public defender.
Children and their families line the benches inside the courtroom. Stacks of
delinquency petitions are placed neatly next to the large pile offace sheets.6
The first child of the day, only fourteen years old, had pled no-contest to a
first-degree felony six months earlier. Now he faces third-degree felony and
first-degree misdemeanor charges. After speaking with the 5 '3 ", 150 pound
adolescent about the charges, the lawyer notices his face is blank. Obviously
confused, he turns to his mother. The unfortunate truth is that he barely un-
derstands how he arrived at the courthouse, let alone the charges that he is
facing. His mother, aware of this reality, begins to cry. The lawyer poses
questions, which are answered by the mother and child.
The youth's psychological history is extensive and severe, ranging from
bipolar disorders to anger management issues. Although an attorney's day
is overflowing with time pressures and obligations, under these circum-
stances, at the top of his to-do list should be filing a motion for competency.7
I. INTRODUCTION
It is imperative that a criminal defendant understands the nature of the
proceedings against him and has the ability to assist his defense counsel dur-
ing trial.' Whether tried in juvenile court or as an adult in criminal court, the
3. A.M.W. v. Portesy, 714 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (describing
the term "pick-up order" as one often used in juvenile proceedings to describe the orders to
take the children into custody); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.207(3) (2003) (stating that taking a
child into custody is not equivalent to an arrest, but will precede a finding of whether the
taking was a lawful one).
4. Term describing a state's offer to a child when he or she is a first time offender. This
is most commonly offered for minor misdemeanors and if completed successfully often results
in the state's dismissal of the charges.
5. Probation is a court-imposed criminal sentence that, subject to certain conditions,
calls for the release of the convicted person back into the community instead of prison time.
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 978 (7th ed. 1999).
6. P.H. v. Fryer, 570 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (describing the
juvenile's "face sheet" and probable cause affidavit as evidencing his prior charges in the
juvenile court system).
7. See § 985.223 (providing circumstances for which a competency evaluation may be
raised); see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.095 (stating the procedures involved when competency of a
juvenile is raised).
8. THOMAS GRIsso, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES 83 (David Anson & Debra
Fink eds., 1998) [hereinafter GRISSO 1]; see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402
(1960) (holding that the test for competency must be whether the defendant "has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-
[Vol. 28:3:575
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concept remains the same: a child must be competent to stand trial.9 This
article focuses on competency questions and the attorney's obligations when
representing a minor. Beginning with Part II and through Part VII, this arti-
cle focuses on the impact of the Tate decision. Part VIII analyzes the history
of due process rights in juvenile court, including the right to counsel, by sift-
ing through the rationales of two landmark juvenile cases.' ° Part IX empha-
sizes the importance of a juvenile's right to be tried while competent. Part X
tackles the predicament lawyers often encounter when they disregard the
duty to file a motion for competency: ineffective assistance of counsel."
Part XI addresses the judge's role in determining whether a juvenile is com-
petent. Part XII proposes a legislative change requiring a mandatory compe-
tency hearing for a youth under the age of sixteen charged with a serious
crime. Part XIII will conclude that a mandatory competency hearing is cru-
cial, without which, a youth is not sufficiently protected in the criminal jus-
tice system.
II. THE TATE OPINION
The grand jury returned a first-degree and felony murder indictment
against Lionel Tate on August 11, 1999."2 Tate was only twelve years old.'3
Evidence introduced at trial demonstrated that he viciously killed Tiffany
Eunick.'4 In fact, his six-year-old victim sustained in excess of thirty-five
injuries, including a skull fracture, contusions to the brain, more than twenty
bruises, a fractured rib, kidney and pancreas wounds, and a detached liver."'
Tate was convicted of premeditated murder. 6 Despite Tate exhibiting odd
behavior during trial, which should have raised serious questions about his
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him.").
9. GRISSO 1, supra note 8.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16; see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165 (stat-
ing that court has a duty to advise a child of his or her right to counsel and unless that right is
waived by the child, that counsel shall be appointed at each and ever stage of the proceed-
ings).
11. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984). Tate does not discuss this issue
because it was not raised on appeal. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 47-54 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2003) (discussing the points on appeal, none of which raised the issue of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel).
12. Jodie Needle, Boy Charged With Murder in Death of Playmate, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Aug. 12, 1999, at B2.
13. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47.
14. Id.
15. Id. Experts on both sides agreed these injuries were not the result of an accident. Id.
16. Id.
3
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competency, a motion for a competency evaluation or a hearing was not filed
until the post-trial hearing. 17
III. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Tate's post-trial and appellate attorney, Richard Rosenbaum, called for
that post-trial hearing to demonstrate Tate lacked the competency to stand
trial prior, during, and subsequent to trial. 8 The testimony of Tate's trial
counsel, Jim Lewis,19 was sought by Rosenbaum, but would only be allowed
if Tate waived the attorney-client privilege. ° At the hearing, Rosenbaum
argued Tate did not appreciate the consequences of refusing to waive the
attorney-client privilege.2' Indeed, the record indicated Tate merely followed
his mother's orders not to waive.2 Nevertheless, despite the fact that both
attorneys, Rosenbaum and Lewis, took the position that it was in his "best
interests to waive the privilege," after conferring with his mother, Tate re-
fused2 3 Consequently, the trial judge refused to allow Lewis to testify and
held that raising the competency issue after Tate had been convicted was
untimely.24 Therefore, the court denied the post-trial motion for a compe-
tency evaluation and a hearing.25
IV. THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
As a result of that denial, the main issue on appeal was whether a com-
petency evaluation was constitutionally mandated.26 More specifically, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal questioned whether Tate had had "sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and whether he had a rational, as well as factual, understand-
17. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 47. His appellate counsel argued Tate was not competent during
any stage of the proceedings. Id. The primary thrust of that competency motion was that Tate
did not understand the consequences of going to trial and could not assist counsel before,
during or after trial. Id.
18. Id.
19. Needle, supra note 12.
20. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003). Lewis wanted to tes-
tify for him so that the court would be aware of what led to his belief that Tate was not com-
petent during trial. See Paula McMahon, Attorneys Renew Bid for Evaluation of Tate, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Mar. 7, 2001, at B3.
21. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 48-49.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
[Vol. 28:3:575
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ing of the proceedings against him. 27 Tate's lack of understanding was evi-
dent though his behavior.28 Although Lewis was prohibited from testifying
about Tate's behavior during the trial, his troubling demeanor and attitude
during the post-trial hearing supported a need for a competency hearing.29
For example, Rosenbaum argued that Tate was drawing pictures, not listen-
ing, apparently oblivious to the proceedings, and simply not helping with his
defense.30 In addition, Tate lacked any real comprehension of his situation.31
Rosenbaum pointed to such indications as that his eyes constantly wandered,
illustrating a lack of comprehension of his situation.32  Nevertheless, the
judge completely disregarded Rosenbaum's arguments, concluding a "lack of
interest in the proceedings did not equate withincompetency.
' 33
V. THE EXPERT TESTIMONY AT TRIAL
However, due to the extensive and significant defense expert testimony
at trial concerning Tate's inability to understand his situation, the compe-
tency issue should have been addressed in the lower court.34 It went uncon-
troverted that Tate possessed an IQ of approximately ninety.35 Furthermore,
Wiley Mittenberg, 36 a neuropsychologist, testified Tate's mental age was
equivalent to that of a nine or ten-year-old. 37 Joel Klass, a child psycholo-
gist, explained that Tate had the social maturity of a six-year-old.38 Lastly,
27. Id.; see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
28. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
34. Id.
35. Id; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 39, 45 (4th ed. 1994) (explaining the essential feature of mental retarda-
tion as subaverage intellectual functioning coupled with limited adaptive abilities). Intellec-
tual abilities are considered together with adaptive abilities, i.e., communication, self-care,
self-direction, health and safety. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra, at 39. Taking
into account a measurement error of about five points, a person with an IQ of 70 may be con-
sidered mildly retarded. Id. at 39-40. Furthermore, even one with an IQ of 75 can be consid-
ered mildly retarded when he lacks certain adaptive functions. Id. An IQ of 71-84 describes
a person with borderline intellectual functioning. Id. at 45.
36. Attorneys Argue Prison Fate of Convicted Teen Murderer, CNN.COM, Mar. 2, 2001,
http://edition.cnn.com/200I/LAW/03/02/wrestling.death.02/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2004).
37. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
38. Id.
5
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even the State's expert witness, Sherri Bourg-Carter, testified Tate was im-
mature.39
VI. THE STATE'S POSITION REGARDING TATE'S COMPETENCY
Notwithstanding Bourg-Carter's earlier testimony at trial, at the post-
trial hearing, she opined that Tate was legally competent. ° Moreover, she
testified that a pre-trial "evaluation" was performed, and Tate's trial counsel
was aware of it.4' Furthermore, a pre-trial agreement between Bourg-Carter
and John Spencer, a defense expert psychologist, called for certain "exami-
nations" to be performed to prevent Tate from being subjected to repeated
testing. 42 Bourg-Carter acknowledged that competency was a logical issue
that a forensic psychologist would "need to consider. 4 3 However, neither a
formal competency hearing nor an evaluation was ever performed. 44 As a
result, Tate's ability to proceed to trial was never examined in a formal com-
petency hearing.45
VII. THE ULTIMATE DECISION BY THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction.46  The
court held that the denial of the defense's post-trial demand for a competency
evaluation, combined with the trial court's failure to order, sua sponte,47 a
pre-trial competency evaluation, violated due process.4 ' The decision fo-
cused on 1) Tate's age and immaturity, 2) facts that evolved pre- and post-
39. Id.
40. Id. at 49.
41. Id.
42. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 49. The State also pointed the court's attention to the plea hear-
ing. Id. Tate's trial lawyer, during this plea hearing, consulted with Tate and his mother. Id.
The record revealed that Tate was not willing to accept the plea offer and desired to move
forward to trial. Id. The judge conferred with Tate who informed the court that he had had
plenty of time to speak with his mother and wanted to proceed. Id. Furthermore, he asserted
he had not been coerced and had no questions about his choice. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 49. With-
out a formal competency hearing or even an evaluation, the judge found that "Mr. Tate has
sufficient ability to make a decision in this very important matter." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at48.
45. Id.
46. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 48.
47. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1155 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the term "sua sponte" mean-
ing on the court's own motion or without prompting or suggestion).
48. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 46. See generally Paula McMahon, Court Tosses Verdict Ruling:
Teen's Murder Conviction Reversed Reason: Judge Failed to Order Competency Test, SUN
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Dec. 1, 2003, at Al.
[Vol. 28:3:575
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 7
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/7
2004] THE NEED FOR A MANDATORY COMPETENCY HEARING 581
trial, 3) Tate's lack of experience with the court system, and 4) the complex-
ity of the legal proceedings against him.4 9
VIII. JUVENILES AND DUE PROCESS
A. History of Due Process
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 established the first court for
delinquents under sixteen. It mandated that a child's records must remain
confidential to lessen the stigma of adjudication.5 1 Constitutional protections
were considered unnecessary because children were kept separated from
incarcerated adults and the emphasis was on rehabilitation.5 2 For approxi-
mately the next seventy years, the lack of the right to counsel was justified
through the doctrine of parens patriae, which allowed the State to act in the
best interests of the child rather than to punish him.53 Thus, the proceedings
were not considered adversarial, rendering competency to proceed to trial
and participate in his defense immaterial. 4 By contrast, competency to stand
trial in the adult criminal justice system dates back to 1836, sixty-three years
prior to the Illinois Juvenile Court Act.55 R v. Pritchard involved a deaf and
dumb adult defendant whose attorney questioned his "fitness to stand trial. 56
Pritchard, irrespective of its application to juveniles, is an example of
how the concept of incompetency entered into the criminal justice system
and why it barred conviction.5 7 The court focused on the defendant's compe-
tency and established three elements for determining fitness to stand trial:
49. Tate, 864 So. 2d at 50.
50. Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Still Seeking the Promise of Gault: Juveniles and the Right
to Counsel, 18 CRIM. JUST. 23, 23 (2003).
51. Id. This court was established in Cook County, Illinois and was set up to be a more
forgiving setting than the adult criminal court. Id. Juveniles were kept separate from adults
when incarcerated and detention of any juveniles under the age of twelve was not allowed.
Id.; see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 33 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the term "adjudication" as the
process of judicially deciding a case).
52. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part H: Race and the
"Crack Down " on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 338 (1999).
53. Shepherd, supra note 50; Ellen Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A
Not So Radical View of Holistic Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L.
REV. 288, 296 (2003) (arguing that the civil nature of the proceedings distinguished the juve-
nile system from that of the adult system).
54. GRISSO I, supra note 8, at 85.
55. THOMAS GRISSO, YOUTH ON TRIAL-A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE 74 (2000) [hereinafter GRISSO II].
56. Id. (citing R. v. Pritchard, 173 Eng. Rep. 135 (K.B. 1836)).
57. Id.
7
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1) whether the defendant "stood mute of malice;, 58 2) whether the defendant
is capable of pleading to the indictment; and 3) whether the defendant pos-
sesses the sufficient intellect to comprehend the proceedings to form a proper
defense.59
The Pritchard "fitness to stand trial" test can be compared to the "adju-
dicative competency test" articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
1960.60 Dusky v. United States required that a defendant have a "rational"
understanding of the proceedings and have the cognitive ability to consult
with his attorney. 6' Thus, both Pritchard and Dusky focus on the defendant's
present ability to understand his current situation to participate in his de-
fense.62 However, neither case addressed the problem that convicting an
incompetent defendant, or failing to follow proper procedures to assess his
competence when doubt has been raised, violates the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution.63
In Drope v. Missouri, the defendant was indicted for rape.64 His coun-
sel moved for a continuance seeking examination by a psychiatrist who had
recommended an evaluation. 65 The judge denied the motion.66 On the first
day of the trial, the defendant's wife testified that the defendant attempted to
kill her the previous day.67 On the second day, the defendant attempted sui-
cide.68 His lawyer then requested a mistrial because his client became hospi-
talized.69 The court denied the motion concluding the defendant's inability to
attend was voluntary.7" The defendant was convicted after which he filed a
motion to vacate alleging that the rejection by the court of his request for a
psychiatric evaluation violated his right to due process. 7' The Missouri
Court of Appeal held that neither the psychiatrist's recommendation, nor his
58. Id. "A defendant who 'stood mute' of malice was said to being doing so willfully."
Id.
59. GRISSO 1I, supra note 55, at 74-75; see also Pritchard, 173 Eng. Rep. at 135.
60. GRISSO II, supra note 55, at 75; see Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 n.9
(1960).
61. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
62. GRISSO II, supra note 55, at 74-75.
63. Id. at 75; see Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975).
64. Drope, 420 U.S. at 162.
65. Id. Although it is not stated in the case, the defendant's trial lawyer must have con-
sulted with a psychiatrist to determine whether his client should be evaluated.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Drope, 420 U.S. at 162.
70. Id. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the denial of the motion for a mistrial
and held that the denial of the motion for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion. Id.
71. Id.
[Vol. 28:3:575
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wife's testimony, raised sufficient question about his ability to proceed to
trial to demonstrate a constitutional violation.72 However, the United States
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that sufficient doubt of his competency
was raised and that further inquiry was required.73
Drope addressed the issue within the context of a trial, but the Supreme
Court has also recognized that a defendant cannot enter a guilty plea unless
he is mentally competent.7 4 The bottom line is that, "[i]ncompetency bars
adjudication, whether by plea or by trial."75
While case law afforded an adult the procedural due process protection
of not being tried while incompetent, lack of history and precedent make
understanding the issue of a juvenile's right to be competent to stand trial an
uphill battle.76 Evaluating a juvenile's competency to proceed was consid-
ered unnecessary.77 This was because the juvenile justice system was so set
apart and distinct from that of adult criminal court.78 The two systems dif-
fered in purpose and principle. 79 The purpose of juvenile court was rehabili-
tation for their alleged wrongdoing, rather than punishment.8 0 While the two
seminal cases of Kent v. United States8' and In re Gault8' failed to establish
an absolute right for a juvenile to be competent to stand trial, the right can be
logically inferred from their holdings.83 Competency played practically no
role in the juvenile justice system until 1966.84 Both Kent and In re Gault
granted minors several of the identical due process rights available to adult
defendants.85
In Kent, a fourteen-year-old was arrested after being reported for break-
ing into houses and attempting to snatch several purses.8 6 Two years later,
Morris A. Kent was arrested again, this time for housebreaking, robbery, and
72. Id.
73. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180.
74. Id. (citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993)).
75. GRISSO I1, supra note 55, at 75.
76. Id. at 73.
77. GRISSO 1, supra note 8, at 85.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
81. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
82. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
83. Thomas Grisso, Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial: Questions in an Era of Punitive
Reform, 12 CRIM. JUST. 4, 6 (1997) [hereinafter Grisso IlI].
84. Laurence Steinberg, Juveniles on Trial: MacArthur Foundation Study Calls Compe-
tency Into Question, 18 CRIM. JUST. 20, 21 (2003).
85. Id.; see also GRISSO III supra note 83. But see § 985.228(2) (stating that a juvenile is
not entitled to a trial by jury).
86. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543.
9
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rape.87 Because he was not yet eighteen, Kent fell within the juvenile court's
jurisdiction.88 Kent's mother retained counsel for him the day after he was
arrested.89 Kent's attorney, along with his mother, met with the Social Ser-
vice Director of the Juvenile Court to discuss the possibility of waiving ju-
risdiction.9" His lawyer filed a motion opposing the waiver, asserting that his
client was "a victim of severe psychopathology" and suggesting hospitaliza-
tion for psychiatric observation. 91 Kent's attorney argued that the court
should retain jurisdiction and try Kent as a juvenile to stress rehabilitation. 9
He also requested copies of the juvenile records used to determine whether to
try Kent as an adult.93 The judge did not rule or hold any hearings on those
motions.94 Furthermore, the judge rendered his decision without consulting
Kent's attorney or his mother. 95 Instead, the court merely entered an order
waiving jurisdiction and allowing him to be tried as an adult.96 The judge
simply stated that he made this decision as result of a "full investigation." 97
Following the indictment, Kent's counsel moved to dismiss, claiming the
court erred by allowing Kent to be tried as an adult. 98 The motion was de-
nied.99 Kent's attorney appealed, asserting Kent was not afforded certain
procedural rights that, under normal circumstances, would have been af-
forded to an adult."°
Among other deprivations, he claimed Kent was denied his liberty
without a probable cause determination, had been interrogated by the police
without counsel present, and was never informed of his right to remain si-
lent.' ' On appeal, the United States Supreme Court, avoiding the constitu-
tional issues, found the statute allowing waiver of jurisdiction after a "full
87. Id. at 544.
88. Id. at 543.
89. Id. at 544.
90. Id.
91. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 545 (1966).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 546.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Kent, 383 U.S. at 546.
97. Id. at 548. The Juvenile Court Act, which governed waiver, merely stated there
needed to be a "full investigation." Id. at 547. No standards were set out in the statute to
govern the Juvenile Court's ultimate decision regarding waiver. Id.
98. Id. at 548.
99. Kent, 383 U.S. at 549.
100. Id. at 551.
101. Id. The attorney also argued that Kent's parents were not notified when he was being
interrogated and that he had been unlawfully fingerprinted. Id. The conviction was affirmed
and Kent appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Id.
[Vol. 28:3:575
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investigation" could lead to arbitrary determinations, thereby reversing the
decision.10 2 According to the Justices, this is a "critically important" ques-
tion not capable of fair resolution without the right to a hearing and to effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 03 Thus, Kent began the erosion of the State's
parens patriae role in juvenile courts.
The Court, construing the Juvenile Court Act in Kent to be "rooted in
social welfare philosophy,' explained that juvenile proceedings primarily
focus on the needs of the child and society rather than on adjudicating crimi-
nal conduct. 5 However, despite the State's continuing parens patriae role,
this doctrine is "not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.' ' 06 Conse-
quently, the Justices reversed Kent's conviction, stating that a waiver hear-
ing, although not required to conform to all the requirements of a criminal
trial, "must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."'0 7
The Kent Court, unwilling to further expand the procedural protections for a
minor being tried in juvenile court, took that leap only one year later in the
case of In re Gault.
In In re Gault, a fifteen-year-old was arrested on June 8, 1964.'08 Ge-
rald Gault was brought to a detention facility without his parents having been
notified. 9 After learning of the situation through his brother, his mother
went to the institution and spoke to a deputy probation officer." 0 He told her
why her son was there"' and said a hearing was scheduled for the next
day. ' 2 The deputy filed a petition for the hearing, and although the parents
were verbally informed of the hearing, the deputy never officially served
them.' '3  The petition was unsupported by sufficient facts indicating the
crime Gault allegedly committed.' 14 It merely stated that Gault was a "delin-
102. Kent, 383 U.S. at 552, 553.
103. Id. at 553-554; see also Black v. United States, 355 F.2d 104, 105 (1965) (holding
that the assistance of counsel in the "critically important" waiver determination is vital to the
just determination of juvenile court proceedings).
104. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 555. The Court made it clear this holding was limited to instances involving
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and did not afford minors any additional procedural due
process rights when they are tried in juvenile court. Id. at 556.
107. Id. at 562 (citing Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (1959)).
108. 387 U.S. 1,4 (1967).
109. Id. at5.
110. Id.
11. Id. at 4. Gault had been taken into custody because of a complaint by a neighbor that
he and his friend phoned her making lewd and indecent remarks. Id.
112. Gault, 387 U.S. at 5. It is not clear what type of hearing this was.
113. Id.
114. Id.
2004]
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quent," requested a hearing for a judicial order reflecting the same, and that
Gault needed the court's protection." 5 Additionally, it requested a judicial
order be issued regarding Gault's custody and care." 6
The court conducted the hearing the next day." 7 However, the hearing
was deficient in the following ways: 1) the victim was not present; 2) Gault
lacked counsel; and 3) there was neither sworn testimony nor a record." 8
During this hearing, the judge questioned Gault about his alleged criminal
act."'9 Gault gave conflicting testimony regarding certain admissions that he
made to a probation officer. 20 After the hearing, Gault returned to the deten-
tion center and then was sent home three days later with no explanation
about why he had been detained or why he was released.' 2' The same day,
Mrs. Gault received a note from one of the probation officers, which stated
that the "judge has set Monday June 15, 1964 at 11:00 a.m. as the date and
time for further hearings on Gerald's delinquency.' 22
Gault, his mother and father, and the two probation officers involved,
attended the proceeding.2 3 Again, Gault lacked counsel, with no offer made
to provide counsel. 2 4 Questions posed by the judge led to certain admissions
by Gault regarding the charged crime. 2 5 As a result of the victim's contin-
ued absence, Gault did not have an opportunity to cross-exam. 2 6 Although
one of the probation officers prepared a report of the proceeding, Gault and
his parents failed to receive a copy. 27 Following a finding of delinquency,
the judge sentenced Gault to a State Industrial School until he reached the
age of twenty-one.
28
Gault filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona.2 9 The hearing, however, was in the superior court. 3° It focused on a
substantial and vigorous cross-examination of the trial judge who committed
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Gault, 387 U.S. at 5.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 6.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Gault, 387 U.S. at 6.
123. Id. at7.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Gault, 387 U.S. at 7.
128. Id. at 7-8.
129. Id. at8.
130. Id. The facts do not indicate why the hearing was in the Superior Court.
[Vol. 28:3:575
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Gault. 3' The judge's position was that confinement until Gault reached the
age of majority was appropriate under the Arizona Code. 132 When the supe-
rior court agreed and dismissed the writ, Gault sought review in the Supreme
Court of Arizona. 1
33
Gault argued the Juvenile Code was invalid on its face because it ran
contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 34  He
contended that fundamental procedural rights were denied him at the trial
court level.'35 Those rights included: 1) notice of the charges; 2) lack of
counsel; 3) the lack of the opportunity to confront and cross-examine his
accuser; 4) the privilege against self-incrimination; and 5) appellate re-
view.
136
The Supreme Court of Arizona concluded that due process is "requisite
to the constitutional validity of proceedings in which a court reaches the con-
clusion that a juvenile has been at fault, has engaged in conduct prohibited
by law, or has otherwise misbehaved with the consequence that he is com-
mitted to an institution in which his freedom is curtailed."' 137 However, the
holding was limited to determinations of delinquency resulting in incarcera-
tion.138
Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, expanded on the meaning of act-
ing as parens patriae over a child.'39 Justification for depriving juveniles of
their liberty without providing the procedural protections afforded to adults
arose out of the civil rather than criminal nature of the proceedings. 140 A
minor did not have a "right to liberty but to custody."'14' He had to listen to
his parents and go to school. 142 Thus it followed that a parent's failure,
which results in a delinquent child, calls for state intervention. 43 Accord-
131. Id.
132. Gault, 387 U.S. at 8-9.
133. Jd. at 9.
134. Id. at 9-10.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 9.
137. Gault, 387 U.S. at 12. Notwithstanding this decision by the Supreme Court of Ari-
zona, Gault's writ of habeas corpus was dismissed. Id.; see also In re W., 19 N.Y.2d 55
(1966) (holding that it is unconstitutional to admit a juvenile's involuntary confession); In re
State of Interests of Carlo, 225 A.2d 110 (N.J. 1966) (holding that prior to the admission of a
juvenile's confession, fundamental fairness element of due process must first be met).
138. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
139. Id. at 17.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
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ingly, a child was provided custody and not deprived of any rights.'" Never-
theless, the Court noted, "unbridled discretion, however benevolently moti-
vated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure, and Due
process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual
freedom."1 45  Furthermore, relaxed procedures, busy calendars, and "high-
handed" methods often result in a deprivation of the fundamental rights for
juveniles. 146  Referring to the fundamental fairness rationale in Kent, the
Court found that the same principles of due process apply in a delinquency
adjudicatory setting. 47 Therefore, it would be astonishing not to require pro-
cedural regularity and the exercise of caution implied in the term due proc-
ess. 48 Additionally, "[u]nder the United States Constitution, the condition of
being a boy does not justify a Kangaroo court."' 49 Thus, the Supreme Court
found that Gault was the victim of multiple constitutional violations.'
B. Notice
Due process requires sufficient notice to allow a reasonable opportunity
for preparation.151 More specifically, the alleged misconduct must be "set
forth ...with particularity."' 52  The notification of the June 15 hearing
merely stated there were to be further delinquency proceedings, but failed to
describe the nature of the charges and failed to provide any supporting
144. Id.
145. Id. at 18, 20.
146. Id. at 19.
147. Id. at 30-31.
148. Id. at 27-28.
149. Gault, 387 U.S. at 28; see also Shepherd, supra note 50, at 24.
150. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (1967). Although it was raised on appeal, the court
did not rule on whether a juvenile was entitled to a right of appeal from a finding of delin-
quency. Id. But see § 985.234 (stating that an appeal from a juvenile court order may be
taken to the appropriate district court of appeal by any child and any parent or legal guardian
or custodian of the child).
151. Gault, 387 U.S. at 33.
152. Id.; see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.010(a) (stating that no detention order shall be entered
without a hearing during which all the parties shall have an opportunity to be heard); FLA. R.
Juv. P. 8.0 10(d) (requiring the intake officer to make a diligent effort, in the most expeditious
manner, to notify a parent or custodian of a child to inform them of the time and place of a
detention hearing); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.013 (providing that a detention petition order shall state
the reasons why the child is in custody and should to be detained); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.035
(mandating juvenile delinquency petitions allege facts showing the child to have committed a
delinquent act).
[Vol. 28:3:575
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facts. 153 Thus, the notice was insufficient to provide Gault an opportunity to
reasonably prepare a defense.
54
C. Right to Counsel
Since Gault, a child has the same right to counsel in a juvenile hearing
as in an adult criminal setting because a delinquency adjudication that results
in loss of liberty is equivalent to punishment when convicted in felony
prosecutions.' 5 The assistance of counsel is essential for carefully examin-
ing the facts of his case, as well as determining, preparing and presenting a
defense. 56 The possibility of incarceration is too severe a penalty to not pro-
vide a child with legal representation. 57 Consequently, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands, in those situations where
delinquency may result in incarceration, that the child and parents be notified
of the right to counsel and to the appointment of a lawyer if indigent.'58
D. Self-incrimination
Gault asserted that the privilege against self-incrimination was unavail-
able to him. 59 No one advised him that making certain admissions could
result in a loss of his liberty.' 6 The Court concluded that the privilege
against self-incrimination goes the heart of procedural safeguards necessary
to guarantee that "admissions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy.',
6 1
Providing the privilege against self-incrimination to adults but not children
creates a non-existent exception to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, in
essence excluding minors from its protection.1 62
153. Gault, 387 U.S. at 33.
154. Id.
155. InreGault, 387U.S. 1,36(1967). But see Florida v. T.G., 800 So. 2d 204, 210 (Fla.
2001) (holding that although the inquiry into waiver of counsel in juvenile proceedings should
be equal to that afforded to adults, courts should be even more cautious when accepting a
waiver of counsel from children).
156. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36.
157. Id.; see supra note 10.
158. Gault, 387 U.S. at 41.
159. Id. at 42.
160. Id. at 43-44.
161. Id. at 47.
162. Id.
15
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E. Confrontation and Cross-Examination
Gault also argued that denying his right to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses violated his constitutional rights.'63 Moreover, it was not
enough that sworn testimony was taken of those involved in the juvenile
proceedings.' 64 Absent a finding of a valid confession, confrontation and
sworn testimony by witnesses accessible for cross-examination are indispen-
sable for a finding of delinquency.
61
IX. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
The rising number of children committing violent offenses has been the
catalyst for a change in the way states view competency of a juvenile. 66
Moreover, as juvenile proceedings rapidly approach the similarity of adult
criminal proceedings, the argument that a child must be competent to stand
trial becomes stronger.6  For example, Florida has amended its statutes re-
garding competency to stand trial in juvenile cases to almost mirror the adult
criminal code. 16 The resemblance between the two systems yields a height-
163. Gault, 387 U.S. at 42
164. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 56 (1967).
165. Id.
166. GRISSO 1, supra note 8, at 86; see also Steinberg, supra note 84. Steinberg discusses
more than a century of change in the juvenile justice system from rehabilitation to punish-
ment. Id. The cause for this change seems to be the dramatic increase in homicides and vio-
lent crimes committed by children. Id. Steinberg argues this is due to the increase in the
availability of guns. Id.
167. Judy L. Estren, Adjudicatory Hearings in Delinquency Cases, FLA. Juv. L. & PRAC. §
7.2 (2003) (pointing out that the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure have removed practi-
cally all distinctions between adult criminal trials and adjudicatory hearings). The juvenile
rules mimic those of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. ld. Further, an adjudicatory
hearing is virtually the same, procedurally, as an adult non-jury trial. Id.; see also Jennifer A.
Parker, Role of the Lawyer in Delinquency Cases, FLA. Juv. L. & PRAC. § 2.1 (2003) (arguing
that the juvenile justice system is moving towards protection of the public rather than rehabili-
tation); Julianne P. Sheffer, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Statutes: Reconciling
Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L. REv. 479
(1995) (arguing that juvenile justice systems have increasingly promoted punitive goals);
FLA. STAT. § 985.01 (2003) (stating that the purpose of the delinquency chapter is to "ensure
the protection of society" through "the most appropriate control, discipline, punishment and
treatment while taking into account the need to protect the public safety). Accord McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (upholding the constitutionality of the lack of a right to
a jury trial involving a juvenile). But see § 985.228(2) (mandating that adjudicatory hearings
be held without a jury); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.110(c) (stating that an adjudicatory hearing shall be
conducted by a judge without a jury).
168. Grisso III, supra note 83, at 7; see also § 985.223; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.211 (explaining
competency to proceed as it relates to adults).
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ened interest in examining a youth's competency. Although In re Gault did
not explicitly mandate juveniles be competent to stand trial, that requirement
can be logically inferred from the right to counsel mandated by the Court.'6 9
A right to counsel would be meaningless if an incompetent juvenile was
compelled to stand trial. 7 °
A determination of an adolescent's competency is a complex question
based on evaluations by mental health experts. 7 ' Historically, incompetence
was a tool used by adult defendants with mental illnesses. 72 In addition to
mental incompetence, children have the additional problem of developmental
immaturity.'73 In other words, a minor could be completely free from any
mental disorder, yet, based on his age and immaturity, be unable to proceed
to trial. 7 4 Conversely, a child could be mature, but lack the requisite mental
capacity.' 75 Therefore, it is imperative to analyze an adolescent's cognitive
and psychosocial capacities to understand how they relate to his competence
to stand trial.'76
A 2003 MacArthur Foundation Research Network Study ("MacArthur")
revealed astonishing results involving a juvenile's competence to proceed to
trial."' MacArthur defined adolescence as between ten and seventeen years
old. 7 8 During those seven years, developmental changes are rapid and ex-
169. See Grisso III, supra note 83.
170. Id. at 7; see also In re S.H., 469 S.E.2d 810 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the right
to legal counsel would be meaningless if a juvenile defendant was not capable of exercising it
and participating in his own defense).
171. § 985.223(b) (stating that all determinations of competency shall be made at a hear-
ing based on evaluations of not less than two nor more than three experts appointed by the
court).
172. Steinberg, supra note 84.
173. Id.
174. GRISSO 1, supra note 8, at 86; see also In re Causy, 363 So. 2d 472, 476 (La. 1978)
(stating that a child's "tender years" may form a basis for a finding of incompetency);
Steinberg, supra note 84, at 21.
175. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 22. See generally § 984.223(f) (applying only one set of
factors when evaluating juvenile incompetency regardless of the child's mental status or age).
Experts appointed to evaluate a child must consider whether the child can: 1) appreciate the
charges or allegations against him; 2) appreciate the range of possible penalties that could be
imposed by the judge; 3) understand the "adversarial nature of the legal process;" 4) reveal
important facts to defense counsel; 5) behave accordingly in the courtroom; and 6) testify
relevantly. § 984.223(f).
176. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 22.
177. Id. at 21. Commentators are already using this study to support their legal arguments
relating to juveniles and competency. Lynda E. Frost & Adrienne E. Volenik, The Ethical
Perils of Representing the Juvenile Defendant Who May Be Incompetent, WASH. U. J.L. POL'Y
327, 353 (2004).
178. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 22.
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treme.179  These researchers sought to contrast cognitive and psychosocial
differences with those of young adults, ages eighteen to twenty-four.18° Of
the 1,400 people tested, half were either in jail or a juvenile detention facil-
ity, while the rest were from the general public. 8 '
Almost one-third of the eleven to thirteen-year olds and approximately
one-fifth of the fourteen to fifteen-year olds were deemed not competent to
stand trial. 82 Not surprisingly, many of the younger adolescents could nei-
ther understand the judicial process nor the judge's role. 83 Few could dis-
cern differences between prosecutors and defense attorneys.' 84 Even when
their rights were explained to them, they could not grasp them.'85 Many of
the children fifteen and younger were incapable of putting facts together and
drawing logical conclusions.'86 Their ability to imagine future consequences
stemming from their actions was considerably less than adults. 87 Thirty
percent of eleven to thirteen-year olds performed at the level of mentally ill
adults regarding trial appreciation and interpreting important information.'88
Juveniles under the age of thirteen were least likely to comprehend risks or
consider the long-term consequences of their decisions.' 89 Similar to those
under thirteen, nineteen percent of fourteen to fifteen-year olds also per-
formed at the level of mentally ill adults in relation to trial appreciation and
interpreting vital information. 9  Predictably, adolescents fifteen and
younger were far more likely to just adhere to an authority figure's request
than older adolescents and younger adults.' 9' Overall, adolescents were more
eager than adults to "come clean," particularly when promised the confession
will result in a prize like going home.' 92 Most significant is that these find-
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 23.
183. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 23; see also Grisso III, supra note 83, at 7 (suggesting
that current research indicates that thirteen to fourteen year olds have questionable ability to
deal with abstract legal concepts that a majority of adults can).
184. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 23.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 23.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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ings were the same regardless of the youth's previous contact with the judi-
cial system. 1
93
This study demonstrates that a child's intelligence level can have a
strong impact on whether a juvenile will be deemed competent to proceed to
trial. 94 A disproportionate number of children in the justice system have
below average intelligence and, of course, these were "most likely to lack the
abilities related to competence."'' 95 Additionally, of the incarcerated minors
fifteen years old and younger, two-thirds had an IQ below eighty-nine.' 96
The MacArthur study also suggests the necessity for social policy and
legislative change.' 97 Just as important is that it supports imposing a heavy
burden on defense attorneys to address their juvenile clients' competency
issues.' 9' In fact, Patricia Lee, a member of the MacArthur Research Net-
work, warns that "competency is the first question defense attorneys have to
confront in these cases."' 99
X. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:
THE BURDEN ON THE ATTORNEY
A juvenile charged with a crime faces a frightening experience and is in
a very difficult position.200 Being arrested in and of itself is a traumatizing
experience for a child.20' The decisions he has to make will affect the rest of
his life.202 An attorney must know his juvenile client's level of development
to ensure he is able to appreciate the choices he will have to make and to aid
193. Id.; see also Grisso III, supra note 83, at 8 (stating that research indicates that the
"mere fact that a youth is a repeat offender is not a reliable indicator of the youth's under-
standing of the trial process or his rights"). This is particularly interesting in light of the fact
that the Tate court considered this as a factor in reversing his conviction. Tate v. State, 864
So. 2d 44, 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
194. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 23.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 24; see AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 35.
197. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 24.
198. Id.
199. Id.; see also Grisso II, supra note 55, at 77 (noting that most reported opinions in-
volving adjudicative competency revolved around the lawyer's failure to seek competency
evaluations).
200. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 24.
201. Id.
202. Id. Compounding this are the cognitive defects and learning disabilities from which
the child may suffer. Unfortunately, the minor may be in a situation where he has been aban-
doned by his family. Id. In fact, Lee points to pressures children face when placed in cus-
tody, such as: 1) sitting in a holding cell for hours; 2) waiver of important legal rights; 3) plea
offers from the prosecutors; and 4) plea offers from the judge rushing through their case. Id.
19
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in his defense °.2 3 Thus, failure to explore competency may constitute inef-
fective assistance of counsel. 2' To establish ineffective assistance of counsel
the following must be proved: "1) counsel's performance was deficient, in
that his representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;
and 2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense depriving the defen-
dant of a fair trial, in that there is a reasonable probability that but for coun-
sel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different., 20 5 A rea-
sonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.20 6
A finding of incompetency precludes a conviction, so a failure to inves-
tigate a defendant's competency is ineffective assistance of counsel.0 7 In
Broomfield v. State, the defendant, James Broomfield, pled guilty to robbery
of a firearm and grand theft of a motor vehicle. 0 s One year later he filed a
motion for post-conviction relief alleging he was incompetent when he en-
tered his plea.209 His first trial attorney, Kenneth Garber, testified that he had
filed a motion in the trial court seeking a competency evaluation.2 0 The
psychologist who evaluated Broomfield reported that he was "actively psy-
chotic" and incompetent to stand trial, but that his competency could have
been restored with suitable hospitalization and medication. 21
When a conflict of interest forced Garber to withdraw, Frank Porter was
appointed to represent Broomfield.212 The psychologist's report was given to
Porter.213 By the time of the post-conviction hearing, Porter could not re-
member whether he discussed the report with Broomfield, but he did say that
203. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 24. Lee argues, "the burden is on defense attorneys to
make certain their clients understand the situation and the choices they must make." id.
204. Broomfield v. Florida, 788 So. 2d 1043, 1044-45 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
205. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984); see also Jones v. Florida, 845
So. 2d 55, 65 (Fla. 2003). But see Davis v. Florida, No. SC02-1580, SC02-2472, 2003 WL
22722316, at *3 (Fla. Nov. 20, 2003) (holding that strategic decisions made by trial counsel
do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
206. Jones, 845 So. 2d at 55 (citing Ragsdale v. Florida, 798 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 2001)).
207. Broomfield, 788 So. 2d at 1043, 1044-45 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Jones
v. Florida, 740 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla. 1999)).
208. Id. at 1043. The defendant was currently serving a sentence for a federal crime. The
plea for both of the felonies was to run concurrently with the federal sentence. Id.
209. Id. The defendant did not file a direct appeal from his sentence. Id. Thus, the facts
of the case were developed at the post-conviction hearing. Id.
210. Broomfield v. Florida, 788 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
211. Id. The facts do no explicitly indicate whether Broomfield had at one time been
competent, but the psychologist's report would indicate that because there was a chance of
restoration, he may have been competent in the past. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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he did not have reservations about his client's competency to enter into the
plea.2 14  Notably, however, when asked at the post-conviction hearing
whether he would have permitted Broomfield to enter a plea without a sec-
ond report, Garber responded, "probably not. 215 In addition to Porter's own
observations at the plea hearing, a letter Broomfield sent influenced his deci-
sion not to raise competency.' 1 6 In the letter, Broomfield wrote that he would
be entering his pleas in state court and questioned how his state sentence
would be imposed given his current federal sentence.21 7 It was unclear
whether Porter ever spoke to Broomfield prior to the plea hearing. 2 8 Thus,
testimony by Broomfield was imperative for the trial court's resolution of
whether Porter was ineffective.
Broomfield's testimony at the post-conviction hearing related to Por-
ter's deficient representation. 219 He stated that he had not been given the
psychologist evaluation, and if he had been furnished the report, he would
not have entered his pleas.2 Moreover, Broomfield had been hospitalized in
federal prison and was taking medication.22 ' The trial court found that
Broomfield was competent at the time he entered his pleas and that his coun-
sel was not ineffective.222
On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal concluded that Porter
was ineffective based on his failure to investigate Broomfield's competency
at the time he entered his pleas.223 The psychologist's report that Porter dis-
regarded was sufficient to support an incompetency defense.224 Moreover,
214. Broomfield, 788 So. 2d at 1044.
215. Id.; see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(b) (explaining that upon motion by the court, counsel
for the defendant or the state concerning a defendant's competency, the court shall order the
defendant to be examined by no more than three, nor less than two experts).
216. Broomfield, 788 So. 2d at 1044.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Broomfield v. Florida, 788 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1044. Broomfield also testified that when he entered his plea in federal court,
that judge found him competent. Id.
222. Id.
223. id. at 1045; see also Powell v. Florida, 464 So. 2d 1319, 1319 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1985) (recognizing that a failure to raise a defendant's incompetency can be grounds for inef-
fective assistance of counsel); Lilley v. Florida, 667 So. 2d 887, 887 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (stating that failing to inform the court of a defendant's mental illness and alcohol prob-
lems could rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel); Saunders v. Florida, 704 So.
2d 224 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing a defendant's conviction due to absence of
record refuting claim that counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate defendant's compe-
tency).
224. Broomfield, 788 So. 2d at 1045.
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Porter's reliance on the letter Broomfield sent to him was misplaced. 225 The
court also questioned Porter's personal assessment of Broomfield's compe-
tency when the record did not indicate whether they ever spoke prior to the
plea hearing.226 An attorney's obligation to find out information about his
client, especially when certain facts become known that should trigger fur-
ther inquiry, is imperative to effective representation.227
A lack of client consultation can rise to the level of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel if the defendant can show prejudice resulted. 28 In Jackson
v. State, for example, the defendant alleged that his attorney was ineffective
because he only visited him twice while in prison.29 The Fifth District Court
of Appeal held that the defendant must also show how he was prejudiced by
the failed communication. 230  The defendants in Jackson and Broomfield
were adults, but the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can also be
raised by a youth being tried in juvenile court.23'
Although ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from the failure to
investigate a youth's competency in juvenile court has not been addressed in
Florida, based on Kent and Gault, minors should have the same rights as the
adult defendants in Jackson and Broomfield. A finding of incompetency will
bar adjudication of an adolescent in juvenile court just as it prohibits convic-
tion of an adult or a juvenile being charged as one. 32 Thus, based on the
225. Broomfield v. Florida, 788 So. 2d 1043, 1045 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001). The
court found that the letter Broomfield sent Porter could not rebut the findings of the psycholo-
gist's report. Id.
226. Id.
227. Jackson v. Florida, 801 So. 2d 1024, 1025 n.1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
228. Id. at 1025.
229. Id.
230. Id.; see also Cook v. Florida, 792 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 2001) (holding that failing
to investigate the defendant's family history and mental health mitigators could be ineffective
assistance of counsel); McCann v. Florida, 854 So. 2d 788, 790-91 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (failing to investigate and prepare a meaningful defense may not be a strategic decision
but could rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel). Wyoming has held the failure
of trial counsel to interview a defendant is ineffective assistance of counsel when the attorney
could have realized through a consultation that inculpatory statements were made by his client
which would have lead to the filing of a motion to suppress based on a Miranda violation.
LDO v. Wyoming, 858 P.2d 553, 556-57 (Wyo. 1993).
231. P.M.W. v. Florida, 678 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
juvenile trial counsel's failure to file an initial appeal brief constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel).
232. § 985.223(5) (a)-(c) (mandating that a child found to be incompetent shall remain
under the juvenile court's jurisdiction for two years following the date of the order of incom-
petency). If the court determines that, at any time, a youth will never become competent to
proceed, the court may dismiss the petition for delinquency. Id. Furthermore, at the end of
[Vol. 28:3:575
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rationale of Broomfield, failing to investigate a youth's competency in juve-
nile court can lead to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 233 Accord-
ing to a Senior Attorney of the Broward County Public Defender Juvenile
Division, an influx of ineffective assistance of counsel allegations by juve-
niles because of a failure to explore the youth's competency will be a ramifi-
cation of the Tate opinion. "After Tate, more juveniles will be appealing
based on ineffective assistance of counsel for a failure to inquire into their
competency. 234 Thus, incompetency to proceed must be the first issue an
attorney addresses when his client is charged with a serious crime.235
XI. COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL: THE BURDEN ON THE JUDGE
While the lawyer bears the burden of filing a motion for competency,
the judge carries the responsibility of ruling on the defendant's compe-
tence.236 In addition, when neither of the lawyers raise the issue of compe-
tency, a judge may also have the obligation to order a competency hearing.237
the two year period, if there is no evidence that a child will retain competency within one year,
the court must dismiss the petition. Id.
233. Kentucky recognizes that children are often the victims of informal juvenile judicial
process. Catherine Browning Hendrickson, The Legal Practitioner's Guide to RCR 11.42for
Juvenile Defendants, 5-SPG KY. CHILD. RTS. J. 16, 24 (1997). As a result, counsel and adoles-
cent clients meet for the first time shortly prior to arraignment or trial. Id. Thus, the youth
may have a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel so that disposition may be set aside. Id.
But see A.F.E. v. Florida, 853 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that collateral
relief on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is not practical for a juvenile because
the sentence imposed by the court may conclude prior to the granting of appellate relief).
234. Interview with Melinda Blostein, Senior Attorney, Broward County Public Defender
Juvenile Division, in Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. (Mar. 2, 2004).
235. See Diana Marrero, Miami-Dade 8th Grader Charged with Murdering Classmate in
School, SUN- SENTINEL (Miami-Dade), Feb. 19, 2004, at Al. A juvenile was charged as an
adult for first-degree murder. Id. Steve Drizin, a law professor at Northwestern University,
stated that "one of the first issues that will have to be addressed is the boy's competency to
stand trial in adult court." Id.
236. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 25.
237. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(b) (stating that a court shall, on its own motion, order a com-
petency hearing when the court has reasonable ground to believe the defendant is not compe-
tent to proceed); see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.095(2) (providing that during any time prior to or
during the adjudicatory hearing the court has reasonable grounds to believe the child may be
incompetent, the court on its own motion shall immediately stay the proceedings and order a
hearing to determine the child's competency to proceed); Mike Folks, Judge Rejects Teen's
Plea, Sets Competency Hearing, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Mar. 1, 1995, at B2 (stating
a fourteen-year-old was charged as an adult with murder whereafter the judge did not accept
his plea deal when she learned of his past psychiatric treatment and instead ordered a compe-
tency hearing).
23
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A judge's failure to order a hearing on the issue of a defendant's competency
can violate his constitutional right to a fair trial.238
In Pate v. Robinson, after admitting he shot his wife, the adult defen-
dant was convicted of murder.239 The defense attorney never filed a motion
for competency, and the court failed to order one on its own.24 As a result,
one issue was whether the defendant was competent to stand trial.24 ' The
State argued the trial judge was not required to order a competency hearing
sua sponte.242 After examining the extensive evidence of defendant's trou-
bling behavior, the United States Supreme Court disagreed.243
Each witness for the defense testified that the defendant exhibited er-
ratic behavior and was insane.2" His mother testified that the defendant had
always acted a little peculiarly after a brick fell from the third floor and hit
him on the head when he was seven or eight years old.245 Years later, while
the defendant was visiting his mother from the Army and speaking with a
guest, he jumped up and kicked a hole in the bar.246 When asked what was
wrong, the defendant just paced back and forth with his hands in his pock-
ets.247 At other times he would not speak or answer questions and would
have an odd glare in his eyes.248 He would imagine people were "after him"
and saw people who were not there.249 His behavior was described as ex-
tremely violent and erratic. 250 His grandfather testified to the defendant's
forgetful behavior.251 Testimony also revealed he was suicidal.252
238. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966).
239. Id. at 376.
240. Id. at 376-377.
241. Id. at 376. Another issue was whether Pate was insane at the time he committed the
crime. Id.
242. Pate, 383 U.S. at 378.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 378, 383.
245. Id. at 378.
246. Id. at 378-79.
247. Pate, 383 U.S. at 379.
248. Id. Testimony by the defendant's grandfather indicated that when the defendant
worked for him he would have a strange dazed look in his eyes. Id. at 380.
249. Id. at 379. Testimony indicated that while visiting his aunt he was seeing a person
who "was going to shoot him." Id. During this time his mother testified he was foaming at
the mouth. Pate, 383 U.S. at 379.
250. Id. at 379, 380. On the way to a hospital, he tried to leap from a policeman's car, and
while at the hospital he had to be strapped into a chair. Id. at 379.
251. Id. at 380. The defendant would leave and come back from work without ever realiz-
ing he left. Id. at 380-381.
252. Pate, 383 U.S. at 381. The defendant attempted to kill himself by a gunshot wound
to the head, and another unsuccessful drowning attempt. Id. This came on the heels of shoot-
ing and killing his eighteen month old son. Id.
[Vol. 28:3:575
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 7
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss3/7
2004] THE NEED FOR A MANDA TORY COMPETENCY HEARING 599
After serving time for the murder of his son, the defendant beat up his
mother's brother-in-law?. 3 The mother sought an arrest warrant explaining
to the police that he was out of his mind. 54 In addition, she attempted to
have him arrested for continually fighting on the streets.2 55 The defendant
eventually murdered his wife while she worked 6.2 5  The State offered only
one piece of rebuttal evidence to the testimony that the defendant was not
competent.257
William H. Haines, the Director of the Behavior Clinic of Criminal
Court of Cook County, had examined the defendant two or three months
prior to trial. 25 8 He was not, however, present to testify at trial.2 59 Neverthe-
less, the State introduced his opinion that the defendant "knew the nature of
the charges against him and was able to cooperate with counsel when he ex-
amined him before trial. 26 °
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the defendant was
constitutionally entitled to a hearing to determine his competency; the trial
judge's failure to make that inquiry, sua sponte, denied him of his right to a
fair trial.
A judge's obligation to order a competency hearing is also applicable in
juvenile court when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a child may
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Pate, 383 U.S. at 381-382.
256. Id. at 382. Testimony indicated he came into the restaurant where she worked, stared
at her for a minute, and eventually shot her once or twice. Id. He never said a word the entire
time he was in the store. Id. After the killing, the defendant went to his friend's house who
called the police. Id. The defendant was present when the police arrived but he said he did
not know anything about a murder when asked by the police. Pate, 383 U.S. at 382-383.
257. Id. at 383.
258. Id.
259. Id. The facts do not indicate why Dr. Haines was not present to testify at trial.
260. Id.
261. Pate, 383 U.S. at 385; see also Hill v. Wainwright, 473 So. 2d 1253, 1259 (Fla.
1985). The trial court failed to address the issue of whether the evidence at trial mandated a
competency hearing for the defendant. Hill, 473 So. 2d at 1259. Testimony indicated that the
defendant had an IQ of sixty-six, had a history of grand mal epileptic seizures, mental retarda-
tion with communication issues, and accepting guilt without considering the facts. Id. at
1254-1256. The court, relying on the principle rationale of Robinson, held that the judge's
failure to order a competency hearing, sua sponte, denied the defendant of the right to a fair
trial. Id. at 1259. But see Agan v. Florida, 503 So. 2d 1254, 1256 (Fla. 1987). The mere fact
that a defendant confesses, pleads guilty, and disregards his lawyer's advice does not raise
doubt about his mental competency. Id. The court, on its own motion, must order a compe-
tency hearing only when there is "evidence, information, or any showing before the court that
raises questions concerning the defendant's competency." Id. Here, this principle cannot be
extended to the defendant merely because the decision he made to plead guilty was a bad one.
Id.
25
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be incompetent to proceed.262 W.S.L. v. State is illustrative. A nine-year-old
boy was adjudicated guilty of first-degree felony murder, sexual battery,
attempted sexual battery, and aggravated battery.263 Prior to trial, the child's
trial attorney filed a motion for a competency hearing.26 In support, he in-
cluded the report of the psychologist who had examined the boy.265 Despite
the psychologist's conclusion that the adolescent "did not have an under-
standing of the adversary nature of the criminal justice system and had no
ability to assist his attorney in planning a defense because of his age and
intellect," the trial judge denied the motion.266 The Second District Court of
Appeal held that the psychologist's report provided reasonable grounds to
believe that the juvenile "may have been incompetent., 267 Thus, the court
concluded that the trial judge erred in denying the youth's motion for a hear-
ing to determine his competency to stand trial.268
Although W.S.L. was decided in 1985, the Juvenile Rules have not
changed. When reasonable grounds exist, before or during an adjudicatory
hearing, to believe a youth may be incompetent, the court "shall" immedi-
ately order a hearing to determine the adolescent's competency.269 On the
other hand, the Florida statute relating to incompetency in a juvenile delin-
quency case does not mandate the judge order a competency hearing; it is
discretionary.27° It states that when there is reason to believe, prior to or dur-
ing a delinquency case, that the child may be incompetent to proceed, the
court on its own motion "may" order an evaluation of the child's mental
condition.27' The statute and rule differentiate between the time before or
during an adjudicatory hearing and prior to or during a delinquency case.
Those two periods of time overlap and can be considered the same. For ex-
ample, an adjudicatory hearing can occur at any time "during a delinquency
case." Likewise, any time before or during an adjudicatory hearing is con-
262. W.S.L. v. Florida, 470 So. 2d 828, 830 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985), rev'don other
grounds, 485 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1986); see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.095(2) (providing that during
any time prior to or during the adjudicatory hearing the court has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve the child may be incompetent, the court on its own motion shall immediately stay the
proceedings and order a hearing to determine the child's competency to proceed).
263. W.S.L., 470 So. 2d at 829.
264. Id. at 830.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. W.S.L., 470 So. 2d at 830. The Second District Court of Appeal relied on what was
rule 8.170(a)(1) of the Florida Juvenile Rules of Procedure in holding that the judge was
obligated to order the competency hearing. Id.
269. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.095(a)(2).
270. § 985.223(1).
271. Id.
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sidered to be "part of the delinquency case." Because those two periods of
time can be considered to be identical, the different language in the rule and
in the statute can lead to confusion and unfair results. Thus, making the stat-
ute discretionary and the juvenile rule mandatory is illogical. Moreover, the
rationale of Tate, Pate, and W.S.L. obligates the judge to order a competency
hearing when there are reasonable grounds, which leads to the conclusion
that the discretionary nature of the Florida statute gives a judge leeway he
should not have.
XII. PROPOSAL
The evolution of juvenile competence turns on historical issues of jus-
tice and fairness. 2 Early intervention in a child's development establishes a
pattern that prevents delinquency in later years.2" The most important and
effective programs are those that highlight family support structure, as well
as those providing health care services, and others that stress parental support
and education.274 Interceding in a troubled child's life as soon as possible is
also imperative for the prevention of recidivism.2 75 Likewise, early determi-
nation of a child's competency to stand trial will help to prevent a violation
of his procedural due process rights. The findings of the MacArthur study
illustrate that, on average, children fifteen and younger are less likely to pos-
sess essential characteristics necessary to be competent to stand trial than
those sixteen and older.276 Thus, a mandatory competency hearing for chil-
dren under sixteen, either being tried in juvenile court or in adult court,
would, at the very least, address the issue of competency to stand trial.
Intervening as early as possible to reduce the potential for recidivism is
just as important as the court's obligation to make an initial determination of
a child's competency prior to proceeding on a petition. The former protects
the child from committing future criminal acts, and the latter guards against
adjudicating or convicting an incompetent youth. Therefore, states must
272. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 24.
273. Gloria Danzinger, Delinquency Jurisdiction in a Unified Family Court: Balancing
Intervention, Prevention, and Adjudication, 37 FAM. L. Q. 397, 398 (2003).
274. Id. at 397-98. Danzinger writes that intervening means to do so early in the adoles-
cent's development through pre-school education programs and through parent educational
services that improve the child's ability to prepare for school. Id. at 397. This, she argues,
may set up patterns that prevent criminal behavior by the child when he or she grows up. Id.
It is her position that the children who elect to participate in these programs are less likely to
drop out and become delinquents. Id.
275. Id. Recidivism means that a child has multiple similar charges. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1021 (7th ed. 1999).
276. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 24.
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require immediate obligatory hearings to determine an adolescent's compe-
tency. If a state does not require competency inquiries of a juvenile, a judge
can and ought to consider competency first, says Robert Schwartz, cofounder
and executive director of the Juvenile Law Center. 7  One state does just
that.278
Under Virginia law, a competency hearing is required when the State
Attorney requests a transfer hearing, and the child, fourteen or older, is
charged with what would be a felony if committed by an adult.279 However,
this does not go far enough. A youth charged with a felony in juvenile court
should also be entitled to a mandatory competency hearing. 280 The reasons to
discriminate between the two systems, adult and juvenile, have diminished
with the current movement toward punishment in the juvenile system. 281
"The fact is, the juvenile justice system has become so punitive, the conse-
quences of a juvenile adjudication have such long-term effects on kids' lives,
that we have to address the competence issue., 282 The vital notions of proce-
dural due process support the proposal for a mandatory competency hearing.
The Tate opinion provided a juvenile tried as an adult with an additional
procedural safeguard at the trial court level. Irrespective of Tate's trial law-
yer's failure to move for competency, the judge's failure to do so violated his
due process. However, that holding cannot be limited to a juvenile tried in
adult court. Under W.S.L, it would seem that a judge would have that same
obligation in juvenile proceedings. Due process should not be limited just
because the child is tried as a minor. Mandatory competency hearings for
children under sixteen charged with a felony, either in juvenile or adult court,
would provide important and extra protections to children who can easily fall
victim to a complex and unforgiving system.
Certainly a mandatory competency hearing would be a drain on judicial
and other resources. Nevertheless, the time and money spent trying a child
without addressing his competency wastes judicial resources when the end
result is a reversal because of a constitutional due process violation.283 In
addition, the lack of a compulsory competency hearing can have adverse
consequences on the child as well as undermine the integrity of the judicial
system.
277. Id.
278. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(A)(3) (Michie 2004).
279. Id.
280. Grisso III, supra note 83, at 9 (explaining that youths up to mid-adolescence may
need a mandatory competency hearing).
281. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 25.
282. Id.
283. Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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XIII. CONCLUSION
A child is not just a shorter, more compact version of an adult.2 84 The
immaturity level a youth brings with him to court is evident and must be
considered in a justice system that strives "to be both effective and fair." '85
A lawyer cannot ignore his adolescent client's due process rights any more
than a judge cannot ignore the same. Moreover, uniformity among the Rules
of Juvenile Procedure and the Florida Statutes, relating to delinquency,
should uniformly require a judge to address competency, not merely give
him the discretion to do so. Unfortunately, adolescents under the age of six-
teen will convert from defendants to the vulnerable victims of the Criminal
Justice System without the due process of a mandatory competency hearing
prior to being tried.
284. Steinberg, supra note 84, at 25.
285. Id.
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